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1 Introduction
The regulation of banks, and in particular the setting of capital adequacy standards,
is arguably one of the most important policy issues in the aftermath of the financial
crisis. In many countries large, commercial banks needed to be recapitalized with public
funds in recent years. In several countries, such as Ireland or Iceland, the public bailout
was so massive that it threatened the entire state of public finances. The new Basel III
capital standards, which foresee the ratio of core (Tier 1) capital to risk-weighted assets
to rise to 7 percent until 2019, are therefore widely believed to represent a critical step
forward in ensuring more resilient banking sectors around the world.
The financial sectors of many countries have grown dramatically in recent decades and
represent an important source of value added, highly paid jobs, and - in good times -
tax revenue.1 Therefore, an important concern in policy discussions is that the national
setting of higher capital adequacy standards will not distort international competition
between the banking sectors of different countries, and maintain a ‘level playing field’.
Interestingly, however, it is by no means clear whether individual countries, which
may be tempted to pursue beggar-thy-neighbor policies, have an incentive to set their
national capital standards above or below that of neighboring jurisdictions.2
On the one hand is the conventional concern that maintaining low capital adequacy
rules reduces the cost of doing business for domestic banks, thus securing an ‘unfair’ ad-
vantage in the international competition for bank customers. This concern is echoed in
the entire existing literature on the subject (to be discussed below), which unanimously
holds that national capital standards will be set too lax in the process of international
policy competition, and a ‘race to the bottom’ will therefore result.
At the same time, many countries have enacted capital standards that substantially ex-
ceed the internationally negotiated Basel III rules. Switzerland, for example, introduced
a core capital ratio of 10% for its largest banks, well above the Basel III standards,
and it did so earlier than implied by the Basel schedule. Similarly, the United States
1Auerbach et al. (2010, Figure 9.5) document the increasing fiscal importance of the financial
sector in the United States and the United Kingdom. In both countries, corporate tax revenues from
financial corporations made up more than 25% of total corporate tax revenues in 2003, before the
financial crisis.
2This is very different from the issue of tax harmonization, for example, where the concern is
almost exclusively about a downward competition of tax rates. See Keen and Konrad (2013) for a
recent survey of this literature.
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demands a leverage ratio significantly above the Basel III standard from its largest and
systemically relevant banks. In the European Union, British plans to impose national
capital standards above the Basel III standards met with stern resistance from most
EU partners.3 The final compromise was that the United Kingdom was allowed to im-
plement national capital standards ahead of the Basel III schedule, but that it would
not exceed the capital standards in other EU member states.
One important reason for why countries have enacted tight regulation policies is to
protect national taxpayers. The latter effectively pay for bank failures when govern-
ments make discretionary decisions to bail out individuals financial institutions, but
they are also involved more generally because virtually all developed countries have
national deposit insurance schemes.4 It is therefore no coincidence that many of the
countries which have adopted capital standards above the Basel III rules have large
banking sectors, relative to the country’s GDP. At least in the case of Switzerland, high
capital requirement are also seen as a measure to restore faith in the Swiss banking
system, after one of Switzerland’s largest banks, UBS, had incurred huge losses in the
US subprime loan market, and needed to be saved with large public loans.5
It is also noteworthy that Swiss banks do not seem to have been hurt by the higher
capital requirements imposed by Swiss regulators. Figure 1 plots the market shares
of Swiss banks in the European market for bank credits to the private sector for the
period 2007-2015, and compares it to those of its main European competitors. The
figure shows that the market share of Swiss banks has continuously risen during this
period, from less than 4 per cent in 2008 to 6.5 per cent in 2015, whereas the less
regulated banking sector in Germany, for example, has lost market shares during the
same period.
In sum, these developments question the paradigm that tighter capital standards im-
posed by a country cause a competitive disadvantage for the country’s resident banks,
3See “European Leaders to weigh new capital requirements for banks”, The New York Times, May
1, 2012.
4This argument is stressed explicitly in the communication with which the Board of Governors
of the U.S. Federal Reserve System (2014) motivated higher leverage ratios for systemically relevant
banks: “Higher capital standards for these institutions place additional private capital at risk before
the federal deposit insurance and the federal government’s resolution mechanism would be called upon,
and reduce the likelihood of economic disruptions caused by problems at these institutions.”
5See e.g. “How Switzerland saved its banking industry”, Newsweek Magazine, 27 December 2010.
http://europe.newsweek.com/how-switzerland-saved-its-banking-industry-68855?rm=eu
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Figure 1: Credit shares of banks in five European countries, 2007-2015
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Source: Bank for International Settlements, Credit statistics 2016, Table F2.4: Bank credit to the
private non-financial sector; http://stats.bis.irg/statx/srs/table/f2.4. Credit shares are fractions of
total credits given by banks in 22 European countries.
and that the national setting of capital standards leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ in cap-
ital regulation. And indeed, the European Commission mentions the opposite scenario
of a possible ‘race to the top’ to motivate why capital standards among EU members
must be strictly harmonized at the level of the Basel III accord: “It is uncertain what
the potential impact in terms of costs and growth would be in case of higher capital
requirements in one or more Member States, potentially expanded through a ‘race to
the top’ mechanism across the EU” (European Commission, 2011, p. 10).
Despite its obvious policy relevance, we are not aware of any contribution to the liter-
ature that explains why countries have an incentive to set national capital standards
above the internationally coordinated levels. The present paper aims to fill this gap.
Our model of regulatory competition in capital standards introduces two new features
that jointly offer a motivation for how tighter capital standards imposed by a country
can benefit the resident banks, and why the non-cooperative setting of capital standards
can lead overly strict levels of regulation.
First, our model allows for banks that are heterogeneous in their monitoring ability,
and hence in their probability of failure. When individual banks are unable to signal
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their quality themselves, higher capital standards act as a signal of average quality in
the national banking sector. This is because higher capital standards drive the weakest
banks from the market and thus improve the pool quality of the remaining banks.
Loan-taking firms anticipate the increase in average bank quality and are willing to
pay higher loan rates in exchange for the added security. For low levels of capital
requirements, we show that this selection effect of capital standards can be sufficiently
strong to overcompensate the higher cost of capital, thus increasing the market share
of banks in the more strictly regulated economy.
A second distinguishing feature of our model is that we consider governments that
incorporate taxpayers and consumers in their welfare function, in addition to the profits
of the banking sector. Our model incorporates competitive firms that use bank credit
to produce output for an integrated market. Changes in the availability and the price of
credit thus have consequences for the real economy, and these spill over to the foreign
country through the integrated output market. Moreover, we explicitly incorporate
taxpayers that have to come up for the losses of failed banks due to the existence of a
deposit insurance scheme.
In the Nash equilibrium, we show that tighter capital controls in one country reduce this
country’s aggregate loan volume while increasing the average quality of its banks. These
changes benefit the foreign banking sector, but they simultaneously exert negative
externalities on both foreign consumers and foreign taxpayers. Foreign consumers lose
because the reduced loan volume caused by tighter capital standards reduces aggregate
output, and accordingly consumer surplus, in both countries. Foreign taxpayers lose
because the reduced loan supply from the country imposing tighter capital controls
will, in equilibrium, draw additional, and lower-quality, banks into the foreign banking
sector. This exposes foreign taxpayers to additional default risks, due to both the
higher aggregate loan volume and the lower average quality of their banks. Effectively,
imposing tighter capital controls can thus serve as an instrument to shift default risks
arising from the banking sector from domestic to foreign taxpayers.
The main result of our analysis is that when governments care equally about bank
profits, consumers and taxpayers, the negative externalities that tighter capital re-
quirements impose on foreign consumers and taxpayers will dominate the positive ex-
ternality on the profits of foreign banks. Hence the non-cooperative setting of capital
standards will lead to higher capital requirements than is optimal from a global welfare
perspective, implying a ‘race to the top’ in capital regulation.
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We also consider several extensions of our benchmark model. We show that the reg-
ulatory ‘race to the top’ is even intensified when the banking sector of each country
is partly owned by foreign shareholders. In a further extension, we permit individual
banks to signal their quality by financing their loans with a share of equity that is
(sufficiently) above the minimum capital standard imposed by their country of resi-
dence. In this extended model, an increase in minimum capital requirements causes
more banks to opt into the high quality pool, thus adding a further positive effect on
the equilibrium share of equity financing.
Our analysis is related to several strands in the literature. A first set of papers analyzes
the effects of capital regulation in the presence of moral hazard of banks, and shows
that it curbs risky behaviour (Rochet, 1992; Hellman et al., 2000; Repullo, 2004). A
few papers in this literature also incorporate bank heterogeneity. Morrison and White
(2005) set up a model where the regulator uses both screening and capital requirements
to address simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection problems. As in our model,
capital requirements improve the quality of the surviving banks in their framework,
and hence the average loan quality. Similar results are also obtained in Kopecky and
VanHoose (2006).
Most directly related to our analysis is the small literature on regulatory competition in
the banking sector. Sinn (1997, 2003) models the competition in regulatory standards as
an application of the classical lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970), arguing that consumers
are unable to discriminate between different levels of regulatory quality. Acharya (2003)
introduces competition between bank regulators that choose both the level of capital
requirements and the bailout policy when banks become insolvent. Dell’Ariccia and
Marquez (2006) model regulators that choose national capital requirements by trading
off the aggregate level of bank profits against the benefits of financial stability. All these
papers arrive at the conclusion that national capital standards are set inefficiently
low from a global welfare perspective. Also, none of these papers incorporates bank
heterogeneity, nor firms that use bank loans to produce real output.
A reputation effect that benefits banks is present in the model of Morrison and White
(2009). In their framework, however, the beneficial reputation effect arises from the
quality of the regulator, for which capital requirements act as a substitute. Hence
high capital standards are associated with a negative signal, contrary to our approach.
Moreover, Morrison and White (2009) do not model international competition between
banks and their focus is on the question of whether a uniform regulatory standard is
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beneficial for countries that differ with respect to the quality of their national regulator.
The heterogeneity of banks that we incorporate in this paper has become an important
topic in the recent international trade literature. Buch et al. (2011) show a close em-
pirical link between size, productivity and international activity in the banking sector
that is similar to the well-established patterns for the manufacturing sector. Niepmann
(2013) introduces heterogeneous monitoring ability of banks in a general equilibrium
trade model where banks of different quality and size sort into cross-border lending and
foreign direct investment. These papers do not consider regulatory policies, however.
Finally, the recent public economics literature has stressed the qualitative similari-
ties between regulation and taxation of the financial sector (Keen, 2011). It has also
provided first empirical results showing that recent bank levies have been effective in
increasing the equity-to-asset ratio of European banks (Devereux et al., 2013).
This paper is set up as follows. Section 2 presents our benchmark model. Section 3
analyzes the nationally optimal regulation policy. Section 4 turns to the central issue of
whether decentralized capital standards are set higher or lower than is globally optimal.
Section 5 discusses the robustness of our results and analyzes several extensions of
our benchmark model, introducing in turn foreign ownership of banks, asymmetries
between countries and quality signalling by individual banks. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Banks
Our benchmark model considers a region of two countries i ∈ {1, 2}, which are sym-
metric in all respects. Banks in each country extend loans to firms in an integrated
regional market. In each country multiple, heterogeneous banks operate under the au-
thority of a national regulator who imposes capital requirements ki for all banks within
his jurisdiction. The number of active banks in each country and the volume of loans
distributed by each bank are endogenous.
Banks differ exogenously in their monitoring skills, which determine the quality q of
the individual bank.6 We assume that the variable q is distributed uniformly in the
interval [0,1] and it corresponds to the likelihood that the investment financed by the
6Thus we do not endogenize a risk-taking (monitoring) decision of banks, as is done in much of
the literature on capital regulation. This additional decision margin would add too much complexity
6
individual bank’s loan is successful. Thus, our model effectively assumes that the bank’s
monitoring quality is the critical determinant in the success of firms.
There are several ways in which the quality of a bank can improve the payoff to bor-
rowers during the production process. First, due to their repeated interaction with
different customers, banks acquire a knowledge that is complementary to that of firms
(see Boot and Thakor, 2000). In this sense, q can be interpreted as the general and
sector-specific expertise of an individual bank, which directly affects the probability
of successful production. Second, especially smaller and less mature firms derive sub-
stantial benefits from having long and stable relationships to banks, as they can more
flexibly draw on existing lines of credit (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), or receive
favorable credit terms for new loans (Bolton et al., 2013). With such ‘relationship lend-
ing’, the probability of successful production will again be a function of bank quality,
when q is interpreted as the ability of banks to monitor projects and thus manage the
liquidity pools of their portfolios.7 Given these reasons for why a firm’s success rate
is positively correlated with its bank’s monitoring quality, our assumption that this
correlation is perfect merely serves to simplify the analysis.
Each bank can fund itself either through equity capital or through external funds,
which we take to be saving deposits of individuals. In line with with common practice in
virtually all developed countries, we assume that the savings deposits are fully insured
by the government of the country in which the bank is located.8 Hence, and importantly
for our model, the (expected) costs of bank failures are partly borne by the taxpayers
of the bank’s residence country. Being fully insured against failure, depositors demand
a competitive return on their savings, which we normalize to unity. In contrast, equity
holders may demand a risk premium and the per-unit cost of equity is exogenously
given by ρ ≥ 1.9
in our framework. Instead we focus on the direct role of capital standards in increasing the equity
requirement of banks. This reduces the implicit exposure of taxpayers to the default risks in the
banking sector, which arises from the existence of a deposit insurance scheme.
7See Inderst (2013) for a recent analysis where the expected payoff of projects depends on the
ability of banks to roll over loans, and for examples of capital losses to firms when their bank fails or
encounters liquidity problems.
8The main argument in favor of deposit insurance schemes is that they prevent bank-runs and thus
stabilize the banking system (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). See Barth et al. (2006) for an overview of
deposit insurance schemes around the world, and for a discussion of its benefits and costs.
9This is a standard assumption in the literature (e.g. Hellman et al., 2000; Dell’ Ariccia and
Marquez, 2006; Allen et al., 2011). An alternative setting where the cost of equity depends on the
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Another critical assumption of our benchmark model is that individual banks are not
able to signal their quality to firms.10 Hence, no bank will choose to hold costly equity
capital in excess of the minimum level ki stipulated by the national regulator. At the
same time, the capital adequacy ratio set by the government of country i will, in ways
that we specify below, determine the return that firms are willing to pay for a loan
from a bank resident in country i. The expected profits of a bank in country i with
quality q that chooses to distribute a total number of l loans are then given by
pii(q, l) = q[Ri − (1− ki)]l − ρkil − 1
2
bl2 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2} . (1)
Here Ri is the return per unit of the bank’s loans, which depends on the capital stan-
dards set by the bank’s home country i, but not on the individual quality of the bank.
From this gross loan rate the bank must deduct the costs of savings deposits (1− ki),
which are paid back by the bank only with its success probability q. The return on
the bank loan is zero, if the borrowing firm’s risky investment fails. In this case the
bank will also go bankrupt. Savers will be compensated by payments from the national
deposit insurance fund, whereas equity holders lose all their investment. Total equity
capital in the bank is kil and equity holders have a fixed opportunity cost of ρ per unit
of capital invested (cf. footnote 9 above). Finally, the quadratic cost term (1/2)bl2 rep-
resents transaction costs that are rising more than proportionally when the bank’s level
of operation rises. This term therefore limits the scale of operations of each bank.11 All
net profits, and all uncovered losses, accrue to equity holders as residual claimants.
We assume that all banks are small relative to the overall loan market and hence take
Ri as given when choosing l. The optimal loan volume l
∗ for each bank in country i is
then given by
l∗ =
qφi − kiρ
b
∀ i , (2)
where we have defined the short-hand notation
φi ≡ Ri − (1− ki) ∀ i (3)
to indicate the return per unit of loans for each bank in country i, net of the funding
costs for savings deposits. This term therefore represents the expected increase in the
cash flow of a bank in country i when the success probability of its loan increases.
bank’s quality q is discussed in Section 5.1.
10This assumption will be relaxed in Section 5.4, which introduces (imperfect) quality signalling by
individual banks.
11See Acharya (2003) for a similar assumption.
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It is clear from (2) that the loan volume of a bank is an increasing function of its quality
q. Thus, a better bank is also larger in equilibrium.12 Moreover, the loan volume is an
increasing function of the return Ri and a decreasing function of the capital adequacy
ratio ki, both of which are specific to the country in which the bank is located.
Substituting (2) in (1) determines the optimized profits of a bank of quality q in
country i:
pi∗i (q) =
(qφi − kiρ)2
2b
∀ i . (4)
The equilibrium number of banks in country i is determined by the condition that the
marginal bank, denoted by the cutoff quality level qˆi, receives zero expected profits
from its operations:
qˆiφi − kiρ = 0 ∀ i . (5)
Consequently, only banks with q ≥ qˆi will be active in the market. Equation (5) shows
that capital standards in country i directly affect the cutoff quality level qˆi by increasing
the cost of capital for all banks. As low-quality banks benefit most from limited liability
and cheap deposit funding, they are hit hardest by an increase in capital standards.
Without any capital requirements (ki = 0), all banks will be active in the market
(qˆi = 0). In contrast, full equity financing of banks (ki = 1) results in qˆi = ρ/Ri. Hence,
a necessary condition for a positive number of banks to stay in the market even with
full equity financing is that the cost of equity ρ is lower than the equilibrium return on
loans, Ri. We make this assumption in the following.
It remains to determine the aggregate loan volume of all active banks in country i.
We normalize the exogenously given number of potentially entering banks to unity. To
arrive at the aggregate loan volume, we integrate over the optimal loan volumes (2) of
all active banks. This gives
Li =
1∫
qˆi
l(q)dq =
(1− qˆi)(φi − kiρ)
2b
=
(1− qˆi)2φi
2b
∀ i. (6)
Here (1 − qˆi) is the measure of active banks in country i, whereas (φi − kiρ)/2b gives
the average loan volume per active bank.13 The second step in (6) then uses (5) to
simplify the resulting expression.
12This corresponds to the empirical evidence in Buch et al. (2011) that bank productivity and bank
size are positively correlated.
13Using eq. (2) shows that this term is the unweighted average of the loan volume chosen by the
best bank (with q = 1), and the loan volume of the marginal entering bank with qˆ, which is zero.
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2.2 Firms and consumers
One of the features of our model is that we explicitly incorporate firms that use bank
loans to produce consumer goods. In the following sections this will allow us to study
the welfare effects of capital standards on banks, taxpayers and consumers.
We assume that there is a large number of identical, potential producers in an integrated
final goods market, which do not have any private sources of funds. The potential pro-
ducers compete for credit in the international loan market, where each firm can obtain
credit from either the domestic or the foreign banking sector.14 Each firm that enters
the market in equilibrium demands one unit of credit to produce one unit of output.
Total output in the integrated market therefore depends on the expected number of
successful loans from banks in both countries. Denoting the expected output produced
with loans from banks located in country i by yi, total output is
15
y ≡ yi + yj =
1∫
qˆi
ql(q)dq +
1∫
qˆj
ql(q)dq = Li
(
2 + qˆi
3
)
+ Lj
(
2 + qˆj
3
)
∀ i 6= j . (7)
Next we determine the loan rate that firms are willing to pay to banks from each
country i in the competitive equilibrium. All potential entrants in the final goods
sector have to incur a uniform fixed cost c for their projects. Further, as firms can not
observe the quality of the contracting bank, they have to form expectations about the
average quality of loans distributed by all active banks that reside in a specific country.
We denote the expected success rate of loans originating from banks in country i by qei .
If the investment is successful, the firm sells its product in the integrated market for
the homogeneous consumer good. This output market is characterized by the inverse
demand function P = A − y, where A measures the size of the integrated market. A
firm will not repay the loan if its project fails, but the fixed cost c has been incurred
nevertheless. Thus, allowing for free entry of firms into the output market, the zero
14In effect, the location of firms is irrelevant in our model because all firms are identical and the
output market is integrated.
15Note from (7) that at least two thirds of all loans will lead to successful production, even in the
absence of any capital requirements (i.e., for qˆ = 0). This follows from our assumption of a uniform
distribution of bank qualities and from the fact that high-quality banks supply more loans [see eq. (2)].
The expected success rate increases further, when capital requirements drive the worst banks from
the market and qˆ > 0.
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profit condition for entering, risk-neutral firms implies
qei (P −Ri) = c ∀ i. (8)
Since producing firms are identical, they also make zero expected profits in the aggre-
gate. Effectively, all expected profits are transferred to banks via the loan rate Ri.
To derive the equilibrium loan rate for banks in each country, Ri, we rearrange (8) and
substitute the inverse demand function P = A− y. This gives:
Ri = A− c
qei
− y = A− 3c
2 + qˆi
− y ∀ i. (9)
In the second step of eq. (9) we have assumed that firms rationally anticipate the
average success rate of loans from banks in country i, which is qei = (2+ qˆi)/3 from (7).
Thus the loan price is decreasing in total output and in the amount of fixed costs
c. Moreover, (9) shows that loan rates are country-specific and depend positively on
the expected quality of the banking sector in country i. A higher expected quality of
country i’s banking sector reduces each firm’s probability of failure and thus raises its
willingness to pay for the loan. Hence, national capital requirements ki act as a selection
mechanism by affecting the pool quality of national banks, which in turn determines
the price that borrowers are willing to pay for a bank loan emanating from country i.
Consequently the price of bank loans differs systematically between the two countries
whenever their capital requirements differ, with bank loans from the country with the
higher capital requirement receiving a higher return.
2.3 Market equilibrium and welfare
To derive the market equilibrium, we substitute eq. (9) into (5) and, together with (2),
into (7). This yields a system of three simultaneous equations:
qˆ1
[
A− 3c
2 + qˆ1
− y − 1 + k1
]
= ρk1, (10a)
qˆ2
[
A− 3c
2 + qˆ2
− y − 1 + k2
]
= ρk2, (10b)
y = y1 + y2 =
1
b
∫ 1
qˆ1
[
q2(A− y − 1 + k1)− qk1ρ− q2
(
3c
2 + qˆ1
)]
dq
+
1
b
∫ 1
qˆ2
[
q2(A− y − 1 + k2)− qk2ρ− q2
(
3c
2 + qˆ2
)]
dq. (10c)
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Equations (10a)–(10c) jointly determine the cutoff qualities of banks, qˆ1 and qˆ2, and
the aggregate output level y, all as functions of the capital requirements k1 and k2
imposed by the two countries. These core variables then determine the total level of
loans from each country from (6) and the country-specific loan rate from (9).
We consider a national regulator in each country who sets capital requirements so as
to maximize national welfare. Welfare in country i is taken to be a weighted sum of
bank profits Πi, tax revenue Ti and consumer surplus S:
Wi = αΠi + βTi + γ
S
2
, α, β, γ ≥ 0. (11)
Here Πi ≡
∫ 1
qˆ
pi∗i (q) [cf. eq. (4)] denotes the aggregate profits of all banks of country i
that are active in the regional market. As we have discussed above, this aggregate
corresponds to the sum of all gains and losses accruing to equity holders in the banking
sector of country i. In our benchmark analysis we assume that all equity holders are
residents of country i.16 In addition, the regulator considers the expected costs to
resident taxpayers when banks fail and depositors must be compensated for their losses
through the deposit insurance fund. Hence the expected tax revenue Ti will always be
negative. Finally, by affecting the supply of loans, capital standards also affect aggregate
output and hence consumer surplus. Since the output market is regionally integrated,
and the model is symmetric, we allocate one half of the total consumer surplus S in
the integrated market to each of the two countries.
Note that the three components of national welfare included in (11) cover all agents
in country i whose income is affected by capital regulation. Depositors can be ignored
because they are guaranteed a fixed return (normalized to unity), which equals their
opportunity costs of funds. Moreover, recall that all producing firms make zero profits
from eq. (8).
The components of national welfare can be directly calculated from the equilibrium in
the loan market. Total profits in the banking sector of country i are given by aggre-
gating (4) over all active banks. This yields
Πi =
∫ 1
qˆi
(qφ− kiρ)2
2b
dq =
(1− qˆi)φiLi
3
=
6by2i
(2 + qˆi)2(1− qˆi) ∀ i , (12)
where we have used (6) and (7) to express banking sector profits in country i as a
function of output with loans from country i and of the cutoff quality of banks in i.
16The case where the banking sector of each country is partly owned by foreign residents is analyzed
in Section 5.2.
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The expected losses borne by taxpayers in country i arise from the deposit insurance
scheme.17 These losses are determined by the share of deposit financing, the aggregate
loan volume, and the average failure probability of country i’s banks. Moreover, we
abstract from international contagion effects and assume that the losses from failed
banks arise only in the country in which the bank is located.18 Aggregating and using (6)
and (7) in the second step gives
Ti =
−(1− ki)
b
∫ 1
qˆi
(1− q)(qφi − kiρ)dq = −(1− ki)(1− qˆi)Li
3
=
−(1− ki)(1− qˆi)yi
(2 + qˆi)
.
(13)
Finally, total consumer surplus in the region is
S =
1
2
(A− P )y = y
2
2
, (14)
which is shared equally in equilibrium between the two symmetric countries.
From (12)-(14) we can determine the effects of capital requirements on national and
regional welfare, as well as its components.
3 Nationally optimal capital standards
In this section we analyze the effects of capital standards that are set in a nationally
optimal way. In Section 3.1 we first discuss the effects that capital requirements have
on the equilibrium in the loan market. Section 3.2 then analyzes the welfare effects of
capital standards. It first analyzes the effects of introducing a small capital requirement
and then turns to the conditions under which a symmetric Nash equilibrium in capital
standards exists.
3.1 Capital standards and the loan market
In a first step we derive the effects that a unilateral increase in country i’s capital re-
quirement ki has on the equilibrium in the loan market. The changes in the endogenous
17Our analysis abstracts from insurance funds paid by the banking sector. From 2016 onwards the
member states of the European Union, for example, are building up an EU-wide ‘resolution fund’,
financed by levies on member states’ banks. This fund, however, is built up only gradually and with
a moderate overall target volume.
18See Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and Beck and Wagner (2013) for analyses of inter-
national regulatory coordination when bank failures in one country have adverse effects on banks in
the other country.
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variables qˆi, qˆj, yi and yj (where i 6= j) are derived in Appendix A.1 and are given by19
∂qˆi
∂ki
=
(ρ− qˆ)Θ + ρ(φ+ c˜qˆ)(2 + qˆ)(1− qˆ)2
2(φ+ c˜qˆ)Ω
> 0 , (15)
∂qˆj
∂ki
=
qˆ(1− qˆ)κ
2(φ+ c˜qˆ)Ω
, (16)
∂yi
∂ki
=
(1− qˆ)Θκ
12b(φ+ c˜qˆ)Ω
, (17)
∂yj
∂ki
=
−2φ(1− qˆ)(1− qˆ3)κ
12b(φ+ c˜qˆ)Ω
,
∂y
∂ki
=
(1− qˆ)κ
2Ω
, (18)
where we have introduced the short-hand notations
Θ ≡ 6b(φ+ c˜qˆ) + 2φ(1− qˆ3) > 0, (19)
Ω ≡ 3b(φ+ c˜qˆ) + 2φ(1− qˆ3) > 0, (20)
c˜ ≡ 3c
(2 + qˆ)2
, (21)
and
κ = −φ [3(ρ− 1)(1 + qˆ) + (1 + 2qˆ)(1− qˆ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost effect
+ c˜(1− qˆ)(2 + qˆ)ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection effect
<> 0. (22)
Equation (15) shows that an increase in country i’s capital requirement unambiguously
raises the quality of the cutoff bank in this country, qˆi. This is due to both the higher
cost of equity in comparison to savings deposits, and to the reduced volume of implicit
taxpayer subsidies as a consequence of the higher equity ratio. Hence, by raising the
cost of finance for all banks, capital requirements drive the weakest banks in country i
from the market.
The remaining effects in (16)–(18) all depend on the size of κ, as given in (22). It is
thus critical for our analysis to discuss the effects summarized by κ in detail. As shown
in (22), the effect of a higher capital requirement on the total level of performing loans
can be decomposed into two parts. The first term is unambiguously negative, as capital
standards raise the costs of refinancing for all banks. We label this the cost effect of
higher capital standards. The second term involving c˜ [see eq. (21)] is, however, positive.
This captures the positive effect of higher capital requirements on the pool quality of
banks in country i. The rise in qˆi induced by a higher capital requirement [see eq. (15)]
19To save on notation we omit country subscripts in the following when no confusion is possible,
invoking the symmetry of our model.
14
results in a higher loan rate that firms are willing to pay for loans from banks based in
country i, as they face a lower probability of losing their fixed cost c. In the following
we will refer to this effect as the selection effect of capital standards. In sum, we can
therefore not sign κ, in general.
Figure 1 illustrates the two cases corresponding to κ < 0 and κ > 0 for the introduction
of a small capital requirement in country i. Eq. (6), together with (7) yields an inverse
supply function RS(yi) that describes the loan rate in country i as a positive function
of yi when yj is held constant. At the same time, P = A− y¯j − yi gives the price that
competitive firms achieve in the output market, as a function of country i’s volume
of successful loans. From this, the demand for loans from banks in country i, RD(yi),
can be derived as a parallel shift of the demand function in the output market. The
vertical intercept of this shift is determined by the firms’ fixed investment cost c and
the average success probability qˆi [see eq. (9)].
In the absence of any capital requirements, the loan supply curve for country i’s banks,
R0S, starts at per-unit refinancing costs of unity. This represents the case of pure deposit
finance. A small capital requirement ki shifts the loan supply curve upward (cost effect).
The associated increase in the cutoff quality of country i’s banks also leads to a parallel
upward shift of the initial loan demand demand curve R0D, by lowering the firms’
probability of losing their fixed costs (selection effect). In Case A, given in the upper
panel of Figure 1, the fixed cost c is small and the shift in the loan supply curve
dominates the shift in the loan demand curve. As a result the equilibrium shifts from
E0 to E1 and the volume of successful loans given by country i’s banks is reduced
from y0i to y
1
i . This case thus corresponds to κ < 0. In Case B, shown in the lower
panel of the figure, the firms fixed costs c are sufficiently large so that the upward shift
in the loan demand curve to R2D dominates the shift in the loan supply curve. Hence
the equilibrium shifts from E0 to E2, resulting in an increase in successful loans by
country i’s banks from y0i to y
2
i . This corresponds to the case κ > 0.
The implications for country j then follow from the equilibrium in the loan market.
If κ < 0, banks in country i distribute fewer loans in the aggregate. This raises the
loan rate for banks in country j. The higher profitability will draw additional banks
in country j into the market, thus lowering qˆj [eq. (16)]. Moreover, the aggregate loan
volume in country j will rise, and with it the output yj generated from these loans
[eq.(18)]. Hence a unilateral increase in country i’s capital requirement shifts business
from banks in country i to banks in country j. If κ > 0, all effects are reversed. In
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Figure 2: The effects of a small capital requirement in country i
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this case, a higher capital standard in country i will boost the aggregate loan supply
of banks in country i. The expansion of loans from country i will then reduce the loan
price for banks in country j, raising qˆj and reducing yj.
3.2 Welfare effects of capital standards
In a second step, we use the effects on the loan market equilibrium variables, as given
in (15)–(18), to determine the effects of the capital standard ki on country i’s welfare.
Differentiating the welfare function (11) and its components (12)–(14) gives
∂Wi
∂ki
= α
∂Πi
∂ki
+ β
∂Ti
∂ki
+
γ
2
∂S
∂ki
,
where
∂Πi
∂ki
=
18by2i qˆi
(1− qˆi)2(2 + qˆi)3
∂qˆi
∂ki
+
12byi
(1− qˆi)(2 + qˆi)2
∂yi
∂ki
, (23)
∂Ti
∂ki
=
(1− qˆi)yi
(2 + qˆi)
+
3(1− ki)yi
(2 + qˆi)2
∂qˆi
∂ki
− (1− ki)(1− qˆi)
(2 + qˆi)
∂yi
∂ki
, (24)
1
2
∂S
∂ki
=
y
2
∂y
∂ki
. (25)
In the following we will evaluate the welfare effects in equations (23)–(25) at a minimum
capital standard of ki = 0 and at a maximum capital ratio of k = 1, respectively. The
first implies that the banks’ funding needs can be fully met by cheap (and insured)
savings deposits, whereas the latter case implies that all lending must be financed by
more expensive equity. We will derive the conditions under which aggregate welfare is
increasing in ki when evaluated at ki = 0, but falling in ki when evaluated at ki = 1.
Since all arguments of the welfare function (11) are continuous in ki, an interior optimal
capital standard must then exist for each country i when these conditions are met.
We first evaluate equations (23)–(25) at an initial capital standard of ki = 0, that is, we
ask how welfare in country i is affected by the introduction of a small capital standard.
Note that an initial capital standard of ki = 0 implies qˆi = 0 from (5). Turning first
to the effects on the profits of country i’s banking sector in (23), the first term in
this expression vanishes when qˆi = 0 initially. Hence the effects on bank profits are
exclusively determined by the change in the aggregate level of successful loans (i.e.,
output), as given by the second term. The induced output change also determines the
change in consumer surplus in the integrated market, as given in (25).
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The effects on tax revenues in (24) are threefold. The first effect gives the direct, positive
effect on tax collections (i.e. a reduction in expected subsidy payments) by decreasing
the bank’s reliance on deposits that are backed by a tax-financed insurance mechanism.
Moreover, increasing the critical bank quality qˆi, and hence raising the average success
rate of loans, additionally reduces the expected burden on taxpayers by the second
effect. The sign of the third effect is ambiguous, however, as it will depend on the
change in the aggregate volume of loans offered by banks in country i, and hence on
the sign of κ.
In Appendix A.2 we derive the conditions under which (23)–(25) are all positive when
evaluated at ki = 0 initially, and the introduction of a small capital standard strictly
increases welfare in country i. These conditions are given by
3(2ρ− 1)c
3ρ− 2 > (A− 1), (26a)[
15
8
+
1
4b
]
c < (A− 1). (26b)
The inequality in (26a) is just the condition for κ to be positive at k = 0. Effectively,
this requires that the firms’ fixed investment costs c must be sufficiently large, relative
to the market size parameter A, which determines the profit margin of banks. If condi-
tion (26a) is fulfilled, the selection effect of capital standards dominates the cost effect
when both are evaluated at an initial capital adequacy ratio of zero. Inequality (26b)
states, in contrast, that the firms’ fixed cost, and hence the induced expansion of bank
loans is not so large as to overcompensate the positive first two effects of a small capital
standard in the tax revenue expression (24).20 We summarize these results in:
Proposition 1 (i) When firms’ fixed production costs are sufficiently high, relative to
the size of the output market [condition (26a) holds], then introducing a small capital
standard ki > 0 raises the aggregate profits of country i’s banking sector.
(ii) If, in addition, the firms’ fixed costs c are not overly high, relative to market size
[condition (26b) holds], then introducing a small capital standard ki > 0 benefits banks,
consumers and taxpayers in country i simultaneously and country i’s welfare is im-
proved for any combination of α, β, γ ≥ 0.
Our model thus shows that in the presence of selection effects, introducing capital stan-
dards may be unanimously approved by all agents in a country, even if the regulation
20Note that conditions (26a) and (26b) are not mutually exclusive. For example, if ρ = 1 and b = 2,
both conditions are simultaneously fulfilled when 3c > A− 1 > 2c.
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is imposed unilaterally. In particular, introducing a small capital standard may be in
the overall interest of the country’s banking sector when the latter is heterogeneous.
By raising the costs of doing business, the capital standard drives the least productive
(most risky) banks from the market. High-quality banks will then benefit from the
market exit of low-quality banks via a higher loan rate. When firms value the increase
in the pool quality of banks sufficiently, as measured in our model by their fixed costs
of production c, then the higher profits of infra-marginal banks dominate the profit
losses of marginal, low-quality banks. These redistributive effects between heteroge-
neous banks may thus explain why large and productive banks do not generally oppose
national capital standards, and in some cases even actively advocate them.
We now turn to the other extreme case and evaluate (23)–(25) for an initial capital
ratio of ki = 1 (full equity financing of loans). For ki = 1, the first term in the tax
revenue expression (24) is positive, whereas the other two terms are zero. Since the
first term in the profit expression (23) is also positive and the remaining terms in (23)
and the consumer surplus term (25) are positive multiples of κ, it follows directly that
κ < 0 must hold at ki = 1, if an interior optimum for national capital standards is to
exist. Moreover, since the negative terms involving κ must exceed the positive terms
in (23) and (24), we now have to specify relative weights for the three components
of national welfare. A natural choice is to assume that the social planner places equal
welfare weights on bank shareholders, taxpayers and consumers so that α = β = γ = 1.
For this benchmark case, Appendix A.3 derives the following sufficient conditions for
∂Wi/∂ki < 0 to hold at ki = 1:
A >
[
(3b+ 2)ρ
2b[6(ρ− 1)− 1] +
3
2
]
c and A >
[
8(3b+ 2)
15b
+
3
2
]
c. (27)
The two conditions summarized in (27) imply that market size is sufficiently large,
relative to the firms’ fixed production costs c, so that the cost effect of capital standards
dominates the selection effect at the maximum capital ratio of unity. Moreover, the
first part of condition (27) will only hold when ρ is sufficiently above unity, implying
that increasing the capital requirements is sufficiently costly for banks.21 Moreover,
the conditions ensure that the negative effects of a rise in ki on bank shareholders
and consumers dominates the remaining, positive effect on taxpayers when all welfare
components are weighed equally in the government’s objective function. Invoking the
21Again, conditions (26a) and (27) are not mutually exclusive. If, for example, ρ = 2 and b = 1,
then conditions (26a) and (27) can simultaneously hold for all c ≤ 0.5.
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symmetry of our model, we can then prove the existence of a symmetric, interior Nash
equilibrium:22
Proposition 2 When governments weigh bank profits, tax revenues and consumer sur-
plus equally (α = β = γ), conditions (27) are sufficient to ensure that ∂W/∂ki|k=1 < 0.
If, in addition, conditions (26a) and (26b) hold, then a symmetric Nash equilibrium
exists in which both countries choose identical, interior capital requirements 0 < k∗i < 1.
Proof: From Appendix A.2 and A.3, conditions (26a)–(26b) imply ∂W/∂ki|k=0 > 0,
whereas it follows from (27) that ∂W/∂ki|k=1 < 0. Since all components of Wi are
continuous functions of ki, the welfare function Wi(ki) must also be continuous in ki.
Hence, for each country i there must exist at least one interior level 0 < k∗ < 1 where
∂Wi/∂ki = 0 holds. Since both countries are identical, this interior optimum must be
reached at the same level of ki, and hence the Nash equilibrium is symmetric. 
Two elements in our model are responsible of the concavity of the welfare function
Wi in the capital ratio ki. Firstly, taxpayers benefit less from a further tightening of
capital requirements, the less they are exposed to the default risks in the national
banking sector. This is seen in the last two terms of eq. (24), which are positive but are
approaching zero for ki → 1. Secondly, the critical term κ falls continuously when the
capital requirement ki is continuously increased. To see this, we differentiate κ in (22)
with respect to ki and use φ = 6byi/[(1− qˆ)2(2 + qˆ)] from (6) and (7). This gives:
dκ
dki
= ε
∂qˆi
∂ki
− 6b[3(ρ− 1)(1 + qˆ) + (1 + 2qˆ)(1− qˆ)]
(1− qˆ)2(2 + qˆ)
∂yi
∂ki
, (28)
where
ε =
−9ρc
(2 + qˆ2)
− 6by
(1− qˆ)2(2 + qˆ)2
{
3(ρ− 1)[5(1 + qˆ) + 2qˆ2] + (1− qˆ)(5 + 2qˆ + 2qˆ2)} < 0.
From the positive effect of ki on qˆi in (15) we see that the first term in (28) is un-
ambiguously negative. Moreover, the second term in (28) is also negative when κ > 0
initially and hence dyi/dki > 0 [see eq. (17)]. Therefore, as long as the value of κ is
non-negative, κ must be unambiguously falling in ki. When conditions (27) both hold,
this process will continue until the sign of κ switches from positive to negative.
22Note that Proposition 2 does not prove uniqueness, and therefore does not exclude the existence
of additional, asymmetric equilibria. Even if such additional equilibria did exist, it seems natural to
focus on the symmetric Nash equilibrium, given the symmetry of the two countries.
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Intuitively, the selection effect of capital standards becomes less important when ki
is increased and the critical quality level of banks in country i rises [eq. (15)]. Since
a higher level of qˆ reduces the heterogeneity of active banks, the producing firms’
marginal willingness to pay for a higher expected loan quality accordingly falls.23
Finally, we determine the sign of κ in the symmetric, interior Nash equilibrium. The
argument starts by setting κ = 0. From (25) and (18) the effect on consumer surplus
is then zero, whereas bank profits and tax revenues will unambiguously rise from (23)
and (24), together with (15) and (17). But this implies, from the concavity of Wi(ki),
that ki must be further raised towards its optimal level. From (28) it then follows that κ
has to fall from its initial level of zero. Hence in a non-cooperative, interior optimum in
capital standards, the value of κ must be negative and the cost effect of higher capital
standards dominates the selection effect. Using (15)–(18) we can then state:
Proposition 3 In a symmetric Nash equilibrium where capital standards are at an
interior optimum, 0 < k∗i < 1 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, the sign of κ in (22) is negative. In the
Nash equilibrium, a marginal increase in the capital standard of country i then reduces
the aggregate loan supply and raises the average quality of active banks in country i,
and it has the opposite effects in the foreign country j.
From the effects summarized in the proposition, we can then immediately infer
from (24) that an increase in capital standards will increase tax revenues (i.e., reduce
taxpayer losses) in country i. Moreover, from (25), the increase in ki will reduce con-
sumer surplus in both countries. The effect on bank profits in country i is ambiguous,
however, as the first effect in (23) is positive, but the second effect is negative.
4 Are decentralized capital standards set too low?
In the last section we have established under which conditions a symmetric Nash equi-
librium in regulation policies exists in our model. We now turn to analyzing the effi-
ciency properties of this decentralized policy equilibrium. Since countries are symmetric
in our benchmark model, we can simply define regional welfare as the sum of national
welfare levels
WW = Wi +Wj ∀ i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, (29)
23This is seen by differentiating the loan rate (9) with respect to the expected loan quality qei .
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where Wi is given in eq. (11). Choosing ki so as to maximize aggregate welfare, eq. (29)
would imply ∂WW/∂ki = 0. The nationally optimal capital standards derived in the
previous section are instead chosen so that ∂Wi/∂ki = 0. Hence, any divergence be-
tween nationally and globally optimal capital requirements is shown by the effect of
country i’s policy variable ki on the welfare of country j. If ∂Wj/∂ki > 0, then the
capital requirements chosen at the national level are ‘too lax’ from an aggregate welfare
perspective, as an increase in ki would generate a positive externality on the welfare of
country i. The reverse holds if ∂Wj/∂ki < 0. In this case the externality on the foreign
country is negative and nationally chosen capital requirements are ‘too strict’ from an
overall welfare perspective.
Differentiating Wj with respect to ki gives (see Appendix A.4):
∂Wj
∂ki
= α
∂Πj
∂ki
+ β
∂Tj
∂ki
+
γ
2
∂S
∂ki
=
−κyj(1− qˆ)
2Ω(φ+ qˆc˜)
[
αφ− γ(φ+ qˆc˜)− β(1− kj)(2 + 5qˆ + 2qˆ
2)
(2 + qˆ)2
]
. (30)
There are three terms in the squared bracket of (30). Note that the common multiplier
for all these terms is positive because the effects must be evaluated at a negative value
of κ in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (Proposition 3).
The first term in the squared bracket gives the effect on the profits of country j’s
banking sector. This effect is unambiguously positive. The reason is that the higher
capital standard in country i reduces aggregate loan supply of country i’s banks. This
raises the loan rate for banks in country j and thus raises their aggregate profits. The
second effect in the squared bracket gives the effect on country j’s consumers. This effect
is negative as the fall in country i’s aggregate loan supply reduces aggregate output
in equilibrium [eq. (18)]. This loss of consumer surplus is transmitted to country j
through the integrated output market. Moreover, the multiplier associated with the
loss in country j’s consumer surplus (φ + qˆc˜) is larger than the multiplier associated
with the rise in country j’s bank profits (φ), whenever there is a positive selection effect
(i.e., when c˜, and hence c is positive). This implies that when banking sector profits
and consumer surplus are weighed equally in the national welfare function (i.e., when
α = γ), the sum of the first two effects in the squared bracket is negative.
To explain the higher weight of the negative consumer surplus term, it is again helpful
to analytically decompose the reduction in the aggregate loan supply in country i into
a cost effect and a selection effect. The cost effect reduces each individual bank’s size
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due to the higher cost of capital [see (2)], whereas the selection effect stems from
the increased cutoff quality qˆi, which drives low-quality banks in country i out of
business. Importantly, banks in country j, benefit only from the cost effect of country i’s
reduction in loan supply, as only this part puts banks in country j at a competitive
advantage. In contrast, the higher expected loan quality associated with the selection
effect raises the loan rate in country i, but not in country j. Consumers in j suffer from
both effects, however, as both reduce aggregate loan supply and hence output.24
Finally, the third effect in (30) is also unambiguously negative. This effect gives the
change in expected tax subsidies that taxpayers in country j have to pay for their
failing banks. These tax subsidies will unambiguously increase, because the aggregate
size of bank loans rises in country j [see eq. (18)], and the average failure probability
also rises, due to the lower cutoff quality of country j’s banking sector [eq. (16)].
Summing up this discussion, we see that tighter capital regulation in country i will, on
net, cause a negative externality on country j’s welfare whenever consumer surplus is
weighed at least as high as bank profits. Capital standards will then be ‘too strict’ in
the non-cooperative regulatory equilibrium. This is stated in our main result:
Proposition 4 When governments weigh the surplus of banks and consumers equally
(α = γ), then non-cooperatively set capital standards exceed those that maximize ag-
gregate welfare in the union and a ‘race to the top’ in capital standards occurs. This
‘race to the top’ is more pronounced, if (i) the valuation of taxpayers’ losses in the
government objective function is large (β is high), and (ii) if the ‘selection effect’ of
capital standards is strong (c is large).
Proposition 4 is in direct contrast to the results in the existing literature, which have
found that the non-cooperative setting of capital standards leads to a ‘race to the
bottom’, or to a ‘competition of laxity’ (see Sinn, 2003; Acharya, 2003; Dell’ Ariccia
and Marquez, 2006). Effectively, these contributions have focused on the effect that
24To explain why the isolated cost effect is identical in size for banks (positive) and consumers
(negative) in country j, note from the zero profit condition of firms in (8) that, for given cutoff
qualities qˆi and qˆj , the increase in the consumer price P induced by the fall in the aggregate loan
supply just equals the induced change in the loan rate earned by country j’s banks. Since the initial
equilibrium is symmetric, with both countries sharing equally in both the supply of loans and the
consumption of output, the loss in consumer surplus for j’s residents arising from this effect is thus
just equal to the rise in the profits of country j’s banking sector.
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capital requirements have on the profits of national banking sectors. The same effect is
also present in our analysis, and it corresponds to the positive first effect in the squared
bracket of (30). However, our model adds two new effects to this analysis that reverse
the direction of the net externality in equilibrium.
First, bank loans produce real output in our model, and the output markets of the two
countries are integrated. Changes in the overall availability of credit in country i thus
affect consumer surplus in both countries. Therefore, while banks in country j benefit
from a tighter capital regulation in country i, consumers in country j simultaneously
lose. Moreover, as we have discussed above, the loss in consumer surplus will be larger
than the gain in bank profits when lending and output markets are both competitive
and when banks are heterogeneous and a loan premium exists for a better pool quality
of banks (selection effect).
Secondly, we incorporate taxpayers in our model, which eventually pay for the deposit
insurance that banks draw on when their loans default. Capital regulation in one coun-
try increases taxpayer risks in the foreign country because foreign banks will increase
their aggregate loan volume in equilibrium. Bank heterogeneity adds a further effect
because lower-quality banks are drawn into the foreign banking sector, thus increasing
the average default risk of banks there. In sum, our model shows that higher capital
standards can be used to shift risks from domestic to foreign banks and thus, via the
national deposit insurance funds, from domestic to foreign taxpayers.25
The shifting of taxpayer risks is explicitly mentioned in the European Commission’s
explanatory memorandum motivating why EU member states are not permitted to set
national capital standards above the internationally coordinated Basel III standards:
“Inappropriate and uncoordinated stricter requirements in individual Member States
might result in shifting the underlying exposures and risks (...) from one EU Member
State to another” (European Commission, 2011, p. 10). By showing that capital regu-
lation may impose negative externalities on foreign countries, on net, the results of our
model lend support to the policy of the European Union to harmonize the upper bound
for national capital standards at the level of the Basel III agreement.
25Note the important difference to the ‘financial stability’ argument that Dell’ Ariccia and Marquez
(2006) introduce in the government’s objective function to derive positive equilibrium levels of capital
regulation. In their model, tighter capital requirements in country i increase financial stability in this
country, but have no adverse effects on financial stability in country j. In contrast, in our model the
reduced risks for taxpayers in country i are associated with higher risks for taxpayers in country j,
due to the changed equilibrium in the international loan market.
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5 Discussion and extensions
In Section 5.1 we first discuss the robustness of our results with respect to introducing
quality-dependent cost of equity and imperfect competition to our benchmark model.
We then introduce three distinct extensions. In Section 5.2 we ask which additional
effects arise when banks in each country are partly owned by residents of the other
country. Section 5.3 considers asymmetries between countries and numerically derives
the resulting non-cooperative equilibria. Finally, in Section 5.4. we allow banks to
(imperfectly) signal their loan quality to borrowing firms.
5.1 Discussion
Quality-dependent cost of equity: In our benchmark model we have assumed
that the cost of equity for all banks is exogenously given by ρ ≥ 1, irrespective of
the bank’s quality q. Implicitly, therefore, equity investors have no information about
the quality of each individual bank. The alternative benchmark case is to assume that
equity investors precisely know the quality of each bank. In this case, risk-neutral
investors demand a return to equity equal to
ρ(q) =
1
q
,
where 1 is the risk-free interest rate. Substituting this quality-dependent risk premium
into the bank’s profit function (1) and solving for the optimal bank size gives:
l∗(q) =
qφi − ki/q
b
. (31)
Comparing this with (2) shows that high quality banks have two advantages in this
changed setting: not only will they receive the gross return φ [see eq. (3)] with a higher
probability, but they also face the lower cost of capital. Both of these factors increase
the loan volume of a high quality bank, relative to its lower quality competitors. As
a result, loan volumes will be more concentrated among the high quality banks under
this alternative assumption about the cost of equity.26
Substituting (31) back into the profit function and setting profits equal to zero yields
the cutoff quality of banks in this alternative setting:
qˆ2φ− ki = 0. (32)
26In this respect, the effects are similar to changing the distribution of q in the direction of a higher
density of high-q banks.
25
In comparison to the benchmark case [eq. (5)], the cutoff condition is now quadratic in
qˆ. This is one of the main reasons why the algebra in this variant of our model becomes
far more tedious and involved. However, the qualitative effects of our benchmark model
should remain unchanged. In particular, it can be inferred from (32) that a higher
capital requirement ki will still raise the cutoff quality of banks in country i, thus giving
rise to a selection effect. The cost effect of higher capital standards also remains, as a
higher level of ki reduces the implicit subsidies to the banking sector resulting from
deposit insurance. Therefore, the basic ambiguity of the sign of κ [eq. (22)] should
remain intact.
Moreover, the welfare effects of capital standards do not fundamentally change in this
alternative setup. Since an increase in ki improves the average quality of banks, its
overall effect on tax revenue in (24) is very likely positive. But then, an interior optimum
for ki can only exist when the effect of ki on country i’s aggregate loan volume is
negative (i.e., κ < 0, cf. Proposition 3). If this were not the case, all components
of national welfare in (23)–(25) would be strictly positive, which is inconsistent with
an interior optimum. Moreover, if κ < 0 holds in the Nash equilibrium, then the
externalities arising from regulatory competition should remain qualitatively the same
as in (30), i.e. an increase in ki increases bank profits in country j, but hurts both
consumers in country j (through the reduction in total output), and taxpayers in
country j (through the reduced average bank quality and the higher aggregate loan
volume of country j’s banks). Thus the latter two externalities can again dominate the
positive externality on bank profits, leading to a ‘race to the top’ in capital regulation
(Proposition 4). The precise conditions under which this holds will, of course, generally
differ from our benchmark model.
Imperfect competition: Our model assumes that all banks behave as price takers
in the international loan market. Introducing imperfect competition in a framework
with continuous bank heterogeneity and the explicit modelling of an output market
is conceptually difficult. The closest formal analogy is with models of monopolistic
competition, which are used extensively, in a heterogeneous firms framework, in the
new trade theory (Melitz, 2003). In our setting this would require that both the output
sector and the banking sector are monopolistically competitive, and that the producer
of each output variety requires a specific loan product (an assumption that is not trivial
to defend). Clearly, such a model will be highly complex.
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We can nevertheless discuss which additional effects could be expected in such a model.
The most direct implication is that the effects of capital standards on profits would gain
more prominence. This is because aggregate banking sector profits would be higher in
such a model, and because profits would also be earned by firms in the output market.27
Our above argument that κ < 0 must hold in an interior Nash equilibrium can again
be made here, implying that, in the Nash equilibrium, a higher capital requirement in
country i shifts business from banks in country i to banks in country j.
Would our main result concerning the ‘race to the top’ in capital regulation (Proposi-
tion 4) be upheld in such a setting? We believe that it would, even though the conditions
under which it holds are likely to be more restrictive than in our benchmark model.
The main reason is that the negative externalities on foreign consumers and on foreign
taxpayers will continue to exist in this extended model. Therefore, when the valuation
of taxpayer and consumer losses is sufficiently high, relative to the valuation of profits,
the net externality will remain negative. One reason for why the welfare weight of bank
profits could be relatively low, is given in the following section.
5.2 Foreign ownership of banks
It is straightforward to extend our analysis to the case where residents in each country
own a fraction of the banks in the neighboring country and hence participate in the
profits of the foreign banking sector. International cross-ownership of banks is an em-
pirically important phenomenon.28 To maintain symmetry, let residents of each country
own a share σ of its own resident banks and a share (1− σ) of the foreign banks. The
welfare function of country j then changes to Wj = α [σΠj + (1− σ)Πi] + βTj + γS/2.
Differentiation with respect to ki yields
∂Wj
∂ki
= ασ
∂Πj
∂ki
+ α(1− σ) ∂Πi
∂ki
+ β
∂Tj
∂ki
+
γ
2
∂S
∂ki
. (33)
In comparison to the previous section [eq. (30)], two changes occur in the analysis
of dWj/dki. First, the positive effect of ki on the profits of the banking sector in
27Given their profit-making activities, the location of producing firms would have to be specified in
this setting, and the welfare function would have to incorporate firm profits as an additional argument.
28To give two examples, foreigners held 43% of the shares of the largest commercial bank in Germany,
the Deutsche Bank, in 2014 (www.db.com/ir/de/content/673.htm). The share ownership of the French
bank BNP Paribas included 25.8% non-European institutional investors in 2015, and 11% were held
by state funds from Belgium and Luxembourg (https://invest.bnpparibas.com/en/share-ownership).
27
country j, Πj, is now weighed with a factor σ < 1 and is thus diminished. Secondly,
through their partial ownership of banks in country i, residents of country j are now
also affected by changes in the banking sector profits of country i. The effect of an
increase in ki on aggregate profits in the banking sector of country i is ambiguous,
in general, due to counteracting effects of the reduction in the aggregate loan volume
and the concentration of loans among the more profitable banks [see eq. (23)]. When
the equilibrium capital standard is not too strict, however, so that qˆi is moderate,
then the positive first term in (23) is small and aggregate profits will fall due to the
reduced overall loan volume (since κ < 0 holds in the Nash equilibrium). In this case an
increase in ki leads to an additional negative externality for the residents of country j
and the externalities on the foreign country added by foreign ownership of banks are
then unambiguously negative. Under the conditions of Proposition 4, which imply that
non-cooperatively set capital standards are above their globally efficient levels even in
the absence of foreign ownership, we can then summarize:
Proposition 5 When governments weigh the surplus of banks and consumers equally
(α = γ) and aggregate bank profits in country i fall following an increase in ki
[∂Πi/∂ki < 0 holds in (23)] then foreign ownership of banks magnifies the negative
net externality of capital standards on the foreign country’s welfare and intensifies the
‘race to the top’.
5.3 Asymmetries between countries
As a second extension of our model, we introduce two different types of asymmetries
between the two countries. We first assume that country 1 places a higher welfare
weight (β) on tax revenues than does country 2. This could arise, for example, because
country 1 has a larger size of the banking sector, relative to its GDP, and is therefore
more concerned about the risks to its public finances as a result of failing banks. The
model is too complicated to be solved analytically when there are asymmetries between
countries. We therefore use numerical solution methods and summarize our results in
part A of Table 1.
Table 1A. shows the intuitive result that country 1, which has the higher valuation
of tax revenues (the ‘high-beta country’), will have the higher capital standard in the
non-cooperative equilibrium. As a consequence, the cutoff quality level of banks, qˆ, is
higher in country 1 than in country 2 [cf. eq. (5)]. The aggregate loan volume and
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Table 1: Numerical results for asymmetric countries
k1 k2 qˆ1 qˆ2 L1 L2 Π1 Π2 T1 T2
A. Different welfare weights of tax revenue (βi)
β1 = 1.0 0.335 0.335 0.306 0.306 2.110 2.110 1.068 1.068 –0.325 –0.325
β1 = 1.5 0.437 0.336 0.362 0.303 1.971 2.158 1.014 1.113 –0.236 –0.333
β1 = 2.0 0.531 0.337 0.406 0.300 1.847 2.207 0.957 1.159 –0.172 –0.342
B. Different costs of equity (ρi)
ρ1 = 2.00 0.335 0.335 0.306 0.306 2.110 2.110 1.068 1.068 –0.325 –0.325
ρ1 = 1.75 0.439 0.334 0.330 0.306 2.094 2.106 1.090 1.065 –0.262 –0.324
ρ1 = 1.50 0.627 0.334 0.365 0.306 2.072 2.101 1.128 1.061 –0.164 –0.324
Note: Parameter values held constant: A = 10, α = γ =1.0, β2=1.0, ρ2=2.0.
aggregate profits fall in country 1, as the higher cost of capital dominates the increase
in the loan rate. However, expected losses to taxpayers fall sharply due to both the
lower loan supply and the lower risk exposure of taxpayers in country 1. The reduction
in the loan supply originating from banks in country 1 raises the loan rate in country 2
and draws some additional banks in this country into the market (qˆ2 falls). Accordingly,
the total loan volume and aggregate bank profits rise in country 2. Finally, the higher
loan volume and the lower average quality of resident banks imply higher expected
losses to taxpayers in country 2.
A second asymmetry is to introduce different costs of equity, ρi, in the two countries.
Such differences can arise, for example, when there are differences in the quality of the
regulatory framework across countries (see Morrison and White, 2009) and investors in
better regulated countries demand lower risk premia. Another reason for differences in
the costs of equity could be differential dividend taxes. Investors in the country with the
higher dividend tax would then demand a higher (gross) return on their equity, ρi. The
results for the case where country 1 has the lower cost of equity are shown in part B
of Table 1. A lower cost of equity makes it less costly for the government of country 1
to raise its capital standard, and k1 will accordingly rise in the non-cooperative policy
equilibrium. Hence, in our setting the better regulated country – as measured by a
lower level of ρi – will also have the higher capital standard, contrary to the results of
Morrison and White (2009).
The higher capital requirement drives some banks in country 1 to exit the market,
despite the reduction in their cost of equity. With respect to the aggregate loan supply
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and aggregate profits in country 1, the effects of higher capital standards and lower
costs of equity are mutually offsetting. As a result, the equilibrium changes in these
variables are small. Taxpayer losses are clearly reduced in equilibrium, however, due to
the higher equity ratio and the resulting reduction in the risk exposure of taxpayers.
Finally, the repercussions of changes in country 1’s cost of equity on country 2 are seen
to be small, due to the small changes in the aggregate loan volume of country 1.
5.4 Quality signalling by banks
We now extend our basic model by assuming that banks are able to (imperfectly) signal
their quality.29 In particular, high-quality banks are willing to invest in the costly signal
of holding equity above the minimum standard, in order to signal their high quality
to borrowers. This signal will lead entrepreneurs to pay a higher loan rate to banks
that hold a higher amount of equity than is mandated by the capital requirement of
the bank’s country of residence. Given the complexity of bank balance sheets and the
potential costs of screening, it seems hard to imagine, however, that even the smallest
differences in the capital holding of banks can be observed and understood by the
producing firms. Therefore, and to keep the model tractable, we confine our analysis
in this section to the case where banks can choose one specific, ‘high’ level of equity
khi ≡ ki + k˜i, which exceeds the minimum capital requirement ki by the amount k˜i.30
The isolated effect of changing the funding structure towards more equity is obtained
by differentiating the banks’ optimized profits in eq. (4) with respect to k˜i. This gives
∂pi∗i (q)
∂k˜i
=
qφ− k˜iρ
b
(q − ρ) < 0 . (34)
Holding more equity unambiguously reduces the profits of all banks, because equity is
(weakly) more expensive for banks than savings deposits are, and because the share
of bank funds that is covered by deposit insurance declines. Importantly, however,
29We are particularly indebted to Alan Morrison and Klaus Schmidt for their helpful suggestions
on the modelling strategy in this extension.
30Bank capital holdings in excess of regulated standards are also analyzed by Allen et al. (2011). In
their setting, voluntary capital holdings of banks signal their commitment to monitor loans, rather than
signalling a high quality type as in our analysis. Moreover, in Allen et al. (2011) capital requirements
are chosen either by the regulator or by the bank itself, and the resulting capital holdings are then
compared. In our model, the regulator sets instead a minimum capital requirement, and banks choose
whether to voluntarily exceed this standard, or not.
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eq. (34) shows that the cost of raising equity above the minimum standard is higher for
low quality banks, because these banks benefit most from the existence of the deposit
insurance system. This implies that holding equity above the required level is indeed
a signal of quality, as such a signal can only be profitable for high quality banks.
Indexing the banks’ quality pools by p ∈ {h, l}, all banks that choose to hold the high
equity level khi will then be identified (by producing firms) as being in the high quality
pool (p = h), whereas all banks that hold only the minimum amount of equity ki are
classified as belonging to the low quality pool (p = l). The quality of the bank that
is indifferent between belonging to the high quality pool and the low quality pool is
denoted by q˜. From eqs. (3)–(4), this critical quality level is determined by the condition
that the additional loan revenue from opting into the high quality pool must equal the
additional financing costs:
q˜i
(
Rhi −Rli
)
= (khi − ki)(ρ− q˜i) , (35)
where
Rhi −Rli = c
[
1
qel
− 1
qeh
]
(36)
gives the difference in loan rates paid by entrepreneurs to banks of the different quality
pools h and l in the same country i. The expected probabilities of a successful loan in
the high quality and in the low quality banking pool, qeh and qel, can be calculated as
the weighted average of the number of loans issued by the lowest quality bank and the
highest quality bank within each pool:31
qehi =
(2 + q˜)l1 + (2q˜ + 1)lq˜
3(l1 + lq˜)
, qeli =
2q˜ + qˆ
3
. (37)
Again, the mechanisms of this extended model are best described by means of numerical
analyses. An important property of the extended model is that the switching of banks
from one quality pool to the other causes discontinuities in the welfare function when
ki is gradually increased. This makes the analysis of Nash equilibria difficult even for a
numerical analysis. We therefore analyze exogenous and coordinated changes in ki that
will maintain symmetry between the two countries. Our simulation results highlight
how the fixed cost parameter of firms, c, which gives rise to a selection effect, interacts
with the bank’s self-selection into a certain pool quality p ∈ {h, l}. We differentiate
31To arrive at eq. (37), we substitute eq. (2) in qep = Y
p
Lp =
∫ q¯p
qp
ql(q)dq/
∫ q¯p
qp
l(q)dq, solve the
integrals, and set the pool-specific lower bounds at ql = qˆ , qh = q˜ and upper bounds at q¯l = q˜ , q¯h = 1.
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Table 2: Numerical results for quality signalling by banks
qˆi q˜i R
h
i −Rli yli yhi yi Πi Ti Wi
A. low fixed cost of firms (c = 0.50)
ki = 0.00 0.000 0.961 0.270 1.814 0.230 2.044 6.270 -1.018 9.330
ki = 0.10 0.020 0.922 0.285 1.578 0.446 2.023 6.144 -0.868 9.283
ki = 0.14 0.028 0.901 0.294 1.464 0.551 2.015 6.092 -0.807 9.262
B. high fixed cost of firms (c = 0.75)
ki = 0.00 0.000 0.633 0.879 0.456 1.451 1.908 5.467 -0.655 8.386
ki = 0.10 0.033 0.299 2.544 0.029 1.818 1.847 5.180 -0.163 8.411
ki = 0.14 0.052 0.248 3.063 0.012 1.830 1.841 5.165 -0.115 8.430
Note: Parameter values held constant: A=10, ρ = 1.25, α = γ =1.0, β =1.1, khi =0.9.
case A, where the fixed cost parameter is relatively low (c = 0.50), and case B, where
it is relatively high (c = 0.75). The results of the numerical analyses are summarized
in Table 2. The analytical expressions for output levels, aggregate bank profits and
(negative) tax revenues in this two-tier model are given in Appendix A.5.
In case A, the fixed cost of firms are low, implying from (36) that the difference in
loan rates Rhi − Rli is small in equilibrium. Eq. (35) then implies a relatively large
value of q˜i for any given extra cost of signalling (k
h
i − ki)(ρ − q˜). Hence in this case a
relatively large share of banks remains in the low quality pool. Coordinated increases
in the minimum capital ratio ki raise qˆi above zero, implying that the weakest banks in
each country exit the market. A coordinated increase in ki also reduces the extra cost
of signalling the high quality level khi [the right-hand side of (35)], and thus tends to
reduce the quality level of the cutoff bank q˜i [on the left-hand side of (35)]. With a low
cost parameter c, this effect is moderate, however, and the equilibrium change in q˜i is
therefore also moderate. As a result, bank profits, total output and expected losses to
taxpayers will all be moderately reduced by a coordinated increase in ki. When losses
to taxpayers are valued only slightly more than bank profits and consumer surplus
(α = γ = 1.0; β = 1.1), the net effect on welfare will be negative in both countries.
Hence in this case the optimal coordinated capital requirement would be zero.
In case B, the fixed cost of firms c are high and so is the added loan revenue in the
high quality pool, Rhi −Rli. Since the extra financing costs of being in the high quality
pool are the same as in case A, eq. (35) implies that the quality of the cutoff bank q˜i
is now lower. Hence most loans are now provided by banks in the high quality pool.
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A higher minimum capital requirement ki again reduces the extra costs of signalling
to enter the high quality pool. Since the benefits of being in the high quality pool
(Rhi − Rli) are larger, the cutoff quality q˜i falls more strongly in equilibrium than in
case A, implying that capital requirements reduce the expected losses to taxpayers more
effectively. A welfare function giving a slightly higher weight to taxpayers (β = 1.1)
than to bank profits and consumer surplus (α = γ = 1.0) is then sufficient for a
positive overall welfare effect of capital requirements. Hence, in this case the optimal
coordinated capital requirement eliminates all lending by banks in the low quality pool
(ki ≈ 0.14).
To summarize, introducing quality signalling by banks implies that changes in capital
requirements ki affect the selection of heterogeneous banks in two different ways. First,
as in the benchmark model, an increase in the minimum capital ratio raises the critical
quality for market entry, qˆi, leading the weakest banks to exit the market. A second
and new effect is that a higher minimum capital requirement also changes the cutoff
quality q˜i above which banks self-select into the high quality pool. By increasing the
financing costs in the low quality pool, a higher capital requirement makes it attractive
for a larger set of banks to opt into the high quality pool, and q˜i accordingly falls. This
effect is the stronger, in equilibrium, the higher is the valuation of quality by producing
firms, as measured by their fixed production cost c.
6 Conclusions
This paper has studied international competition in capital standards in a symmetric
two-country model where banks differ exogenously in the quality of their monitoring,
and hence in the likelihood that their loans will succeed. In this setting national capital
standards act as a positive signal for the pool quality of banks in the regulating country,
and imply higher financing costs but also higher loan rates for the resident banks
in equilibrium. In the Nash equilibrium, the higher cost of capital must dominate,
implying that each country’s capital standards impose a positive externality on the
foreign country’s banking sector. At the same time, however, capital standards shift
taxpayer risks from the more regulated to the less regulated country and they also
reduce consumer surplus in the integrated market by lowering the overall availability of
credit. These negative externalities on the foreign country will dominate when national
governments weigh all components of national welfare equally, implying that the non-
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cooperative setting of capital standards leads to a ‘race to the top’. This result is in
direct contrast to the ‘race to the bottom’ on which the existing literature has focused.
Our model can thus explain why countries such as Switzerland or the United States,
which are characterized by large banking sectors and accordingly a high risk exposure
of national taxpayers, introduce capital adequacy rules that exceed internationally co-
ordinated standards. At the same time, our model offers a motivation for why the
European Union has insisted on a strict harmonization of the national capital stan-
dards in its member states, at the levels agreed upon in the Basel III accord. The
consumer surplus externality that arises from capital standards in our model provides
an argument for why the setting of an upper bound on national capital standards is
especially relevant in an integrated market like the EU. Our model results indicate,
however, that the coordinated setting of upper limits on capital standards may also be
a relevant coordination measure in a global context.
Our model can be extended in several ways. A first relevant extension is to introduce an
endogenous monitoring decision of banks while maintaining heterogeneity in monitoring
costs. In this setting capital standards would play a further role in reducing moral
hazard in the banking sector, in addition to their role of signalling the quality of the
national banking sector and of protecting national taxpayers, on which this analysis
has focused. Another relevant extension would be to endogenize the degree to which
governments provide insurance for savings deposits. Such a setting would also permit
an analysis of how the introduction of a supranational deposit insurance scheme – as
is currently being debated as the final pillar of the European banking union – interacts
with the harmonization of capital adequacy standards. Finally, a testable implication
of our model is the existence of a selection effect in real-world loan contracts. That
is, do higher capital standards in the home country of a bank have a positive, and
significant, effect on the lending rate that the bank can charge? We leave these and
other issues for future work.
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Appendix
A.1 Derivation of eqs. (15)–(18)
To analyze the effects of an increase in ki on aggregate output and the cutoff qualities
qˆi in the two countries, we totally differentiate the equation system (10a)-(10c) to get
[A− y − 1 + ki − 2c˜] dqˆi = qˆidy + (ρ− qˆi)dki, (A.1)
[A− y − 1 + kj − 2c˜] dqˆj = qˆjdy, (A.2)
dy =
3(1− qˆ3)c
[3b+ 2(1− qˆ3)](2 + qˆ)2 (dqˆi + dqˆj)−
[3ρ(1− qˆ2)− 2(1− qˆ3)]
6b+ 4(1− qˆ3) (dki + dkj), (A.3)
where we have used the short-hand notations (3) and (21) from the main text, eq. (5)
has been used to simplify terms, and (A.3) has used symmetry after differentiation.
This equation system can be simplified by substituting (A.3) into (A.1) and (A.2). This
yields the two-equation system{
(qˆc˜+ φ)[6b+ 4(1− qˆ3)]− 2qˆ(1− qˆ3)c˜} dqi = 2qˆc˜(1− qˆ3)dqj
+
{
(ρ− qˆ)[6b+ 4(1− qˆ3)]− [3ρqˆ(1− qˆ2)− 2qˆ(1− qˆ3)]} dki (A.4)
{
(qˆc˜+ φ)[6b+ 4(1− qˆ3)]− 2qˆ(1− qˆ3)c˜} dqj
= 2qˆc˜(1− qˆ3)dqi − qˆ[3ρqˆ(1− qˆ2)− 2qˆ(1− qˆ3)]dki (A.5)
Solving the system (A.4) and (A.5) gives equations (15) and (16) in the main text.
Substituting these results back into (A.3) yields
∂y
∂ki
=
(1− qˆ)κ
2φΩ
, (A.6)
where κ and Ω are given in (22) and (20). Finally, differentiating (7) gives
dyi =
1
6b
{−2(1− qˆ3i )dy + 2(1− qˆ3i )c˜dqˆi − [3ρ(1− qˆ2i )− 2(1− qˆ3i )]dki} (A.7)
Substituting (15) and (16) along with (A.6) into (A.7) gives (17) and (18) in the main
text.
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A.2 Derivation of conditions (26a)–(26b)
From (23) and (25) and using (17), a positive effect of capital standards on bank
profits and consumer surplus, evaluated at k = 0 initially, requires that κ > 0 in (22).
Evaluating κ at k = 0 and noting that qˆ = 0 for k = 0 from (5), this condition is
κ|k=0 =
3ρc
2
− (Ri − 1)(3ρ− 2) > 0. (A.8)
The endogenous variable (Ri−1) can be substituted using (9) together with (6) and (7).
This yields
Ri − 1|k=0 =
3b
(3b+ 2)
(
A− 3c
2
− 1
)
. (A.9)
Substituting (A.9) in (A.8), a sufficient condition for κ|k=0 > 0 is
3
2
ρc− (3ρ− 2)
[
A− 3c
2
− 1
]
> 0.
Collecting the terms for c gives condition (26a) in the main text.
A positive effect on taxpayers will result when the positive first two effects in (24) dom-
inate the third effect, which is negative for κ > 0. Substituting in from (15) and (17),
evaluating at k = qˆ = 0 and using y|k=0 = (Ri − 1)/3b from (6) and (7) gives
∂Ti
∂ki
∣∣∣∣
k=0
=
(Ri − 1)
6b
+
3ρ
12b
− κ
12bφ
> 0.
Ignoring the positive first term and noting that φ|k=0 = (Ri − 1)|k=0 gives, as a suffi-
cient condition
∂Ti
∂ki
∣∣∣∣
k=0
> 0 ⇔ 3ρ(Ri − 1)− κ > 0. (A.10)
Using (A.8) and (A.9) yields
∂Ti
∂ki
∣∣∣∣
k=0
> 0 ⇔ 12b(2A− 3c− 2)(3ρ− 1)
(3b+ 2)
>
3ρc
2
. (A.11)
Noting that (3ρ−1) ≥ 2ρ and collecting the terms involving c gives (26b) as a sufficient
condition.
A.3 Derivation of equation (27)
Setting α = β = γ = 1 in (11), evaluating the welfare components (23)–(25) at ki = 1
and using (15)–(18) shows that ∂Wi/∂ki|k=1 < 0 iff ∆ < 0, where
∆ ≡ θκ
(2 + qˆ)2
+
18byiqˆ
(1− qˆ)2(2 + qˆ)3
[
(ρ− qˆ)Θ + ρ(φ+ c˜qˆ)(2 + qˆ)(1− qˆ)2]
+
(1− qˆ)
(2 + qˆ)
(φ+ c˜qˆ)Ω +
(1− qˆ)(φ+ c˜qˆ)κ
2
, (A.12)
36
and Θ, Ω, c˜ and κ are given in (19)–(22).
We decompose ρ−qˆ = (ρ−1)+(1−qˆ), substitute yi = (2+qˆ)(1−qˆ)2φ/6b from (6) and (7)
and replace Ω in the third term by Θ > Ω. Since this term is positive, negativity of
the changed condition, labelled ∆+, is sufficient for ∂Wi/∂ki|k=1 < 0. Collecting terms
gives:
∆+ = Θ
{
(ρ− 1)
(2 + qˆ)
[c˜(1− qˆ)− 3φ] + (1− qˆ)
(2 + qˆ)
[
c˜− (1− qˆ)φ
(2 + qˆ)
+ φ+ c˜qˆ
]}
+ (φ+ c˜qˆ)(1− qˆ)2
[
c˜(2 + qˆ)
2
− (2− qˆ + 2qˆ
2)φ
2(2 + qˆ)
]
ρ. (A.13)
We determine the conditions for negativity of the two terms in (A.13) separately.
Substituting c for c˜ using (21), the condition for the first term (in the first line) to be
negative is
∆1 = 3c(1− qˆ)(ρ+ qˆ)− φ(2 + qˆ)[3(ρ− 1)(2 + qˆ)− (1− qˆ)(1 + 2qˆ)] < 0.
Since this term is unambiguously falling in qˆ, we evaluate it at qˆ = 0. This ensures that
negativity holds for all levels of qˆ. This leads to the condition
φ >
3ρc
2[6(ρ− 1)− 1] . (14a)
The condition for the second term in (A.13) to be negative is
∆2 = 3c− (2− qˆ + 2qˆ2)φ < 0.
This expression has an interior maximum at qˆ = 0.25. Evaluating at qˆ = 0.25 guarantees
that the condition for negativity is sufficient for all levels of qˆ. This gives
φ >
3ρc
2[6(ρ− 1)− 1] . (14b)
In the final step, we note that φi = Ri holds at ki = 1 from (3). Using (9) together
with (6) and (7) gives an expression for Ri that is minimized for qˆ = 0. Evaluating at
this level gives:
R+i =
3b
3b+ 2
(
A− 3c
2
)
. (15)
This corresponds to Ri in (A.9), except that the term (−1) is missing on both sides
of the equation, because φ is now evaluated at k = 1. Equating φ in (14a) and (14b)
with R+i in (15) gives the two conditions summarized in (27) in the main text. If both
of these conditions hold, this is sufficient (but not necessary) for ∂Wi/∂ki|k=1 < 0.
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A.4 Derivation of equation (30)
Using (12)–(14), we can write welfare in country j as
Wj =
6αby2j
(1− qˆj)(2 + qˆj)2 −
β(1− kj)(1− qˆj)yj
(2 + qˆj)
+
γ(yi + yj)
2
4
i 6= j.
Differentiating with respect to ki gives, in a first step
∂Wj
∂ki
=
12αbyj
(1− qˆ)(2 + qˆ)2
∂yi
∂ki
+
18αby2j qˆ
(1− qˆ)2(2 + qˆ)3
∂qˆj
∂ki
− β(1− kj)(1− qˆ)
(2 + qˆ)
∂yj
∂ki
+
3β(1− kj)yj
(2 + qˆ)2
∂qˆj
∂ki
+
γ(yi + yj)
2
∂y
∂ki
. (16)
Substituting in from (16)–(18), using φj = 6byj/[(1 − qˆ)2(2 + qˆ)] and collecting terms
gives eq. (30) in the main text.
A.5 The extended model with signalling by banks
Total output with loans from banks in country i is composed of the output produced
with bank loans from the low and the high quality pool, yi = y
l
i + y
h
i . These are
yli =
∫ q˜i
qˆi
qφli − kiρ
b
dq =
q˜3i − qˆ3i
3b
φli −
q˜2i − qˆ2i
2b
kiρ,
yhi =
∫ 1
q˜i
qφhi − khi ρ
b
dq =
1− q˜3i
3b
φhi −
1− q˜2i
2b
khi ρ. (17)
Analogously, total bank profits in country i are composed of bank profits in the low
and the high quality pool
Πi = Π
l
i + Π
h
i =
∫ q˜i
qˆi
(qφli − kiρ)
2b
dq +
∫ 1
q˜i
(qφhi − khi ρ)
2b
dq
=
(φhi − khi ρ)3
6bφhi
+
(q˜iφ
h
i − khi ρ)3
6b
(
1
φli
− 1
φhi
)
, (18)
where, following integration, the second step has used (5) and (35).
Finally, expected losses to taxpayers can be calculated as
Ti = −
[
(1− ki)(1− qeli )
yli
qeli
+ (1− khi )(1− qehi )
yhi
qehi
]
, (19)
where yli and y
h
i are given in (17), q
el
i and q
eh
i are in (37), and loan levels in each quality
pool p ∈ {h, l} follow from output levels by Lpi = ypi /qepi .
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